Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance by Posner, Eric A. & Weyl, E. Glen
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 251 2014 
Provided by: 
The University of Chicago D'Angelo Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Feb  2 13:06:25 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0041-9494
Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate
Governance
Eric A. Posnert & E. Glen Weyltt
INTRODUCTION
Since Professors Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means's
classic book of 1932,1 the agency costs of corporate governance
have played a central role in discussions about corporate law.
Berle and Means observed that in the modern publicly held cor-
poration, shareholders cannot realistically control managers,
which means that managers can take a range of actions that
transfer the corporation's wealth to themselves rather than to
the shareholders.2 In modern terms, corporations are beset with
agency problems. Large portions of corporate law can be under-
stood as an attempt to minimize agency costs.
The central problem is that the managers of the corporation
exercise control over its activities and have inside information
about which activities are profitable and which are not. Large
corporations have thousands or millions of shareholders because
shareholders seek to diversify their holdings and so avoid buying
all or nearly all of a firm's shares. But by the same token,
shareholders lack information about the workings of a corpora-
tion and thus have trouble judging the managers' decisions. As a
result, managers can take actions that fail to maximize the val-
ue of the corporation and instead transfer value to the managers
themselves. 3
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Examples of such managerial opportunism are well known.
At the extreme, managers can simply expropriate some of the
firm's assets. This is unusual in advanced countries, but manag-
ers can accomplish the same goal sub rosa by overpaying them-
selves, diverting corporate opportunities to independent entities
that they control, overinvesting in perquisites like fancy office
suites, building empires so as to enhance their sense of im-
portance, and so on. Some commentators have blamed the finan-
cial crisis of 2007-2008 on poor corporate governance at major
financial institutions.4
There are two direct mechanisms for controlling managers.
First, shareholders enjoy voting rights with respect to major ac-
tions like mergers, elections of members of the board of direc-
tors, amendments to corporate charters, and stock issuances.
Second, the law provides remedies when managers engage in
the worst forms of self-dealing, like appropriating assets.5 Man-
agers are also, of course, indirectly constrained by other factors,
such as product-market competition and the threat of takeover.
Our focus is on the voting system. The idea behind voting is
that if shareholders can exercise the vote, they can block trans-
actions that do not maximize shareholder value. But there is al-
so an obvious problem with shareholder voting. A voter (or coali-
tion of voters) with a majority of shares (and hence votes) can
outvote the minority and so cause the corporation to make deci-
sions that transfer value from minority to majority, including
decisions that do not maximize firm value. Since investors can
anticipate such majority opportunism, they will pay less for eq-
uity than they otherwise would.
We propose a superior form of corporate voting known as
Quadratic Voting (QV), which is based on theoretical work by
Weyl.6 Under QV, shareholders do not obtain voting rights along
with their shares. Instead, everyone interested in a corporate
outcome that is subject to a vote may buy as many votes as he
wants for the purpose of casting them in that particular election.
The price of the votes is a quadratic function of the number of
4 See, for example, David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung, and Pedro Matos, Corporate
Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions
Worldwide, 18 J Corp Fin 389, 397-402 (2012); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Fi-
nancial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J Corp L 265, 281-93 (2012).
5 See Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance at 17 (cited in note 3). See also
Shleifer and Vishny, 52 J Fin at 742 (cited in note 3).
6 E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying (University of Chicago Working Paper, Apr
1, 2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531 (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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votes purchased. For example, one can buy one vote for $1, two
votes for $4, and three votes for $9. One can also buy fractions of
votes, again for the square of the fraction. The proposal subject
to the vote is approved if the number of votes in favor exceeds
the number of votes against. The money collected from the vot-
ers is transferred to the corporate treasury, and thus ultimately
distributed to the shareholders, except that large shareholders
(with more than 1 percent of stock) would receive back only 1
percent of the money collected from the votes they personally
buy. Any excess thus generated would be distributed pro rata by
shares directly to the rest of the shareholders. The voting pro-
cess is confidential, and collusive arrangements and side pay-
ments would be illegal and subject to enforcement under anti-
trust law.
Under reasonable conditions, QV guarantees an efficient
outcome, which reduces agency costs by preventing managers
from implementing major decisions that benefit them at the ex-
pense of the firm, and preventing large shareholders from direct-
ing the corporation to enrich themselves at the expense of mi-
nority shareholders. There are also a number of positive second-
order effects. QV increases the value of corporate votes, so that
more will be held; and this further constrains managers and
large shareholders, reducing agency costs. QV may improve the
incentive of investors to gather information about firms and to
vote. Finally, as we will discuss, QV may render unnecessary
certain legal protections of shareholders, such as the appraisal
remedy and poison pills, which scholars have long regarded as
costly and imperfect. 7 For all these reasons, QV should lower the
cost of capital.
I. QUADRATIC VOTING
Most groups make collective decisions about public goods by
some form of one-person-one-vote democracy, or one-share-one-
vote in the corporate case. This contrasts sharply with the sys-
tems modern economies use to allocate private goods, in which
those who care more about a good receive more of it. Because
typical majority-rule voting systems in democracies do not allow
individuals to express intensities of preference, they are not effi-
cient in creating public goods in the way that the market is effi-
cient in allocating private goods. As a result, economists have
7 See Part IID.
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proposed alternative social-choice "mechanisms" that incorpo-
rate intensity of preference and provide individuals with an in-
centive to optimally disclose their true intensity of preference.8
Unfortunately, these mechanisms have thus far suffered from
various severe defects that make them impractical. For example,
the most canonical of these mechanisms, that proposed by Pro-
fessors William Vickrey, Edward H. Clarke, and Theodore
Groves, 9 can be turned to the purposes of any two individuals
who collude in their participation in the mechanism or any one
individual who can manufacture a second, false identity. 10
QV, as described above, avoids these difficulties while allow-
ing intensity of preference to be expressed. To see why this rule
incorporates the true intensity of individuals' preferences, con-
sider two different individuals. The first individual has a net
value for building a bridge of $1000; that is, she would be willing
to pay $1000 to see the bridge built. The second individual op-
poses construction of the bridge and is willing to pay $500 to
avoid the taxes its building will impose on him. Both individuals
think that the vote on the bridge is likely to be close enough so
that each vote they purchase moves the chance that the bridge is
built or not in their desired direction by 1 percent. Because both
are rational and neither has a very large impact on the decision,
they share the same value of this estimate and it is independent
of the number of votes they buy so long as this number is not too
large.
How many votes will the first individual buy in favor of the
bridge being built? Each vote gains her a value of. 01 x $1000 =
$10. If she buys only one vote, she spends $1 and receives a ben-
efit of $10. If she buys 2 votes, she spends $4, and so for a mar-
ginal cost of $3 ($4 - $1), she gains another $10. What about 3
votes? Three votes cost her another $5 ($9 - $4), still less than
the marginal gain of $10. If she buys 4 votes, she pays $16,
while if she buys five votes she pays $25, so it is better for her to
buy 5 votes rather than 4-because the cost of the additional
8 See, for example, Alessandra Casella, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, and Thomas R. Pal-
frey, Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes, 120 J Polit Econ 593, 593-99 (2012).
9 William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,
16 J Fin 8, 14-27 (1961); Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 Pub
Choice 17, 22-26 (1971); Theodore Groves, Incentives in Teams, 41 Econometrica 617,
622-29 (1973).
10 See Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom, The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auc-
tion, in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, eds, Combinatorial Auc-
tions 17, 23-24 (MIT 2006).
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voting power ($9) is less than the gain ($10). If she buys 6 votes
she pays $36, $11 more than if she buys 5 votes, but gains only
$10 in value from doing so. Thus she won't buy the sixth vote.
Using a little bit of calculus we can solve for her optimal number
of votes v. The value she gains, in dollars, from buying votes is
10v, while the amount she loses from the cost of votes is v 2 . Set-
ting her marginal cost equal to her marginal benefit of buying
votes, her optimal number of votes is 10 = 2v or v* = 5. So she
should buy exactly 5 votes.
On the other hand, the individual who is willing to pay $500
to avoid the bridge being built will buy negative votes (votes
against the bridge). His utility from votes is -5v - v'2 . By the
same logic, he will optimally buy votes v* = -2.5. More general-
ly, an individual with utility u from the bridge buys votes
v*(u) = .01 x u, because the chance that she changes the outcome
2
is .01. The decision is made based on total votes, which are the
same as the total value of .01 u. But this is positive if and only if
2
the sum of everyone's utilities is as well. That is, the system will
make a decision in favor of whichever outcome (building or not
building the bridge) maximizes the total utility because every-
one buys votes in proportion to the intensity of his or her prefer-
ence. QV is thus efficient, as long as the approximating assump-
tions we used above hold.
In particular, Weyl shows that as long as the distribution of
preferences is commonly known and some technical assumptions
are satisfied, the probability that the decision is made incorrect-
ly approaches 0 as the number of voters n grows large at rate
1 If the distribution of preferences is not commonly known
7 .i
and individuals must make guesses about it based on their own
preferences or the total number of voters is small, matters are
subtler. However, QV is still fully efficient under reasonable
conditions, and much more efficient than voting under a broad
range of cases.
What is so special about the quadratic rule? Why couldn't
individuals just pay proportional to the number of votes they
buy? The key is that the quadratic rule is the only one under
11 The rate depends on the tail properties of the distribution of valuations, and the
result reported here is based on the conservative assumption of a Pareto-tail coefficient
of a = 3. If tails of the valuation distribution are thinner than this, then the rate of con-
vergence is faster. Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying at *14 (cited in note 6).
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which the cost of the marginal vote is proportional to the num-
ber of votes already bought. If, as we assume, the marginal ben-
efit of a vote increases at a linear rate, then the marginal cost of
the vote must also increase at a linear rate; that is possible only
if the total cost of votes increases by the square of the number of
votes.
By way of contrast, suppose that votes had a fixed linear
cost of, say, $7. Then the first individual would be willing to buy
an enormous number of votes, as each is worth $10 to her, and
the second individual would be willing to buy none. The first in-
dividual would thus act as a dictator, buying the whole election
even if there were 10 or 100 other individuals all of whom would
be willing to pay $500 to avoid the bridge being built.12 It is this
disproportionate power afforded to those who are willing to pay
most that makes standard, linear vote buying so unattractive
and is likely the reason so many are opposed to corruption of
politicians, "empty voting" for corporate governance (in which
individuals buy votes without having to buy shares using deriv-
ative contracts), and other cases in which an individual can lin-
early buy influence in a collective decision. As we discuss in the
next Section, this problem can be severe even if votes are linked
to shares.
In practice, though, individuals who feel intensely about an
issue will try to use their financial resources to influence the
outcome, usually by spending on persuading the population to
vote their way. In our democratic system, such spending is con-
stitutionally protected. 13 While such expenditures may have
some of the decreasing returns to expenditures embodied in QV
and thus may roughly approximate efficiency, there are many
reasons to think an explicit vote-buying scheme would work bet-
ter. First, by formalizing the exactly correct rule, QV enhances
efficiency and provides a procedure that is simpler and more re-
liable for participants than the status quo is. Just as the intro-
duction of fiat money, accounting, and formal contract law made
informal systems of reciprocity and exchange that prevailed pri-
or to the modern era into a widespread and efficient market
economy, QV could turn the somewhat chaotic system of bidding
for influence more systematically efficient. Second, expenditures
on persuasion under the current system are largely wasted,
12 For a formalization of this argument, see Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey,
120 J Polit Econ at 599-611 (cited in note 8).
13 See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 19 (1976).
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while the revenue raised on QV would be distributed back to the
population or spent on valuable projects. Finally, QV would dis-
courage further expenditures on persuasion intended to push
nearly indifferent voters slightly one way or the other. Because
votes are costly and the system incorporates preference intensi-
ty, persuasion would aim to convince everyone that a policy or
candidate would increase their utility more than the alternative
rather than just breaking indifferences for swing voters.
Vote buying seems to carry negative connotations, but it is
crucial to notice the difference between QV and standard, linear
vote buying. For one thing, the buyer does not pay a particular
voter (or shareholder) but society (or the corporation), so the
payments are spread among all voters rather than concentrated
in a few. But, more important, the quadratic formula blunts the
impact of money and hence wealth on outcomes. If Mitt Romney
had wanted to spend nearly his whole personal fortune, $100
million, to win the presidential election, that would be his right,
but he could buy himself only 10,000 votes, a substantial num-
ber but hardly enough to guarantee victory given that President
Obama's margin was nearly 5 million votes. 14 And at the same
time, the money he spent could be used to pay off the deficit,
fund government programs, or cut taxes rather than being wast-
ed on advertisements.
An important concern with other mechanisms economists
have proposed was that they allowed for easy and severe collu-
sion: any two individuals willing to collude, or any individual
passing himself off as two individuals, could get whatever out-
come they wish and pay nothing. Collusion is also possible under
QV, but is much less serious. Consider again the example of Mitt
Romney. If he were able to collude with 99 other people, or to
take on 99 other false identities, he could divide his $100 million
into 100 groups of $1 million and purchase 100,000 votes in-
stead. This is much more than he would be able to do on his
own. However, he would run into two obstacles. First, 100,000
votes still is not enough to swing many large elections. Second,
especially if a secret ballot were enforced and fraud illegal, it
would be hard to maintain such collusion. His collusive partners
would have a strong incentive to pocket the money and not buy
the votes, and if he tried to pass himself off as 100 different people
14 Federal Election Commission, Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the
U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S House of Representatives (July 2013), online
at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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he would likely be caught. Thus, because under QV individuals
need to collude with or pretend to be a large number of other in-
dividuals to make a significant difference in the amount of influ-
ence they can exert, its sensitivity to collusion is not excessive.
Weyl makes these arguments quantitatively precise and for-
mal.15 We thus believe that QV's benefits in terms of allowing
individuals to express the intensity of their preferences out-
weigh its costs in terms of collusion or fraud. In the corporate
context, in which contract and antitrust laws can be used to de-
ter collusion and First Amendment rights to political spending
are not at issue, the problem of collusion is even more limited.
II. QV AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Corporate Voting and Its Pathologies
A publicly traded corporation is normally operated by its
management, under the loose supervision of the board of direc-
tors. Shareholders have no say in day-to-day decisions. When a
firm enters a major transaction, however, management must
seek the approval of shareholders and sometimes other stake-
holders such as creditors. Major transactions include mergers,
certain large sales of assets, financial transactions like stock is-
suance that could dilute the value of existing shares, and bank-
ruptcy reorganization plans (in which creditors can vote as well).
We will focus on these types of transactions and use a merger as
our running example.16 But shareholders can vote in other con-
texts as well, including in elections of members of the board of
directors and on amendments to the corporation's charter.
The voting rules are largely determined in the charter, but
they are subject to certain (relatively limited) legal require-
ments. Votes are cast by share, not by shareholder; a shareholder
15 See Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying at *16-22 (cited in note 6).
16 A small literature discusses mechanism design for mergers and acquisitions. See,
for example, Steven J. Brams and Joshua R. Mitts, Mechanism Design in M&A Auctions,
38 Del J Corp L *13-19 (forthcoming 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256763 (visited Mar 2, 2014); Peter Cramton and Alan
Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J L, Econ & Org 27,
30-32 (1991); Alexander S. Gorbenko and Andrey Malenko, Strategic and Financial Bid-
ders in Takeover Auctions, J Fin *14-24 (forthcoming), online at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1559481 (visited Mar 2, 2014). These papers discuss the
process that the board of directors should be required to use when soliciting bids; by con-
trast, our focus is on the process that shareholders use to constrain the board of directors
when it comes time to approve the merger or acquisition.
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who owns 100 shares has 100 votes. Shareholders can thus ac-
cumulate votes by buying additional shares. Voting is by majori-
ty or supermajority rule. For example, approval of a merger re-
quires a majority of outstanding shares in most US states;
various supermajority rules are used in some other countries. 17
Minority shareholders can thus be outvoted.
The weakness of the voting rules, as well as other corporate-
governance mechanisms, is the dominant theme of the corpo-
rate-government literature. Scholars focus on two basic prob-
lems. The first is managerial opportunism, in which managers
implement projects that transfer wealth from shareholders to
managers. Such projects could include outright appropriation,
excessive executive compensation, the diversion of corporate op-
portunities to managers, overinvestment in management per-
quisites, and managerial entrenchment.18
The second problem is that of tyranny of the majority, in
which majority shareholders use their voting strength to expro-
priate value from minority shareholders. Again, the way that
majority shareholders use their voting power will vary. For ex-
ample, they could (in principle) vote for outright appropriation of
the shares of the minority. But more typically, they use their
voting power in more indirect ways-for example, approving
mergers and other transactions that benefit the majority at the
expense of the minority, issuing shares that dilute minority in-
terests, and so forth. 9
The voting system thus addresses managerial opportunism
by giving shareholders the power to block value-reducing trans-
actions, but creates the problem of tyranny of the majority by
giving the majority the power to outvote the minority. A super-
majority rule can reduce but not eliminate the risk of value-
reducing transfers from a (smaller) minority to a (larger) majori-
ty, but also creates the problem of holdouts by a small group
who withhold approval until paid off. These additional transac-
tion costs may block efficient transactions.20 Thus, ordinary vot-
ing fails in its fundamental function of aggregating beliefs and
17 See Reinier Kraakman, et al, eds, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Compara-
tive and Functional Approach 134-36 (Oxford 2009).
18 See Shleifer and Vishny, 52 J Fin at 742-43 (cited in note 3).
19 See id at 758-59.
20 See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 211-12 (Michigan 1962).
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preferences of diverse shareholders to ensure efficient corporate
governance.
Even when the system works in theory, managers and ma-
jority shareholders can often evade the rules. For example, a
corporation may avoid a vote on a merger by creating a shell
corporation that buys the target firm.21 Or a corporation can ef-
fectively eliminate the value of voting in director elections by
failing to provide shareholders with information about candi-
dates who seek to challenge board choices.
In corporate bankruptcy, the pathologies of the voting rules
are also evident. Shareholders cannot be trusted to vote so as to
maximize firm value because they do not have residual owner-
ship rights in an insolvent firm. The law gives voting rights to
creditors. But different groups of creditors may have different
interests, and so the law creates a complicated classification sys-
tem, requiring majority (by number of class members) and su-
permajority (by amount of claims) voting by class, and approval
of all classes subject to a cram-down exception. The bankruptcy
court must also ensure that stakeholders are treated fairly and
equally. There is very little reason to believe that these rules
maximize the value of firms or treat creditors or anyone else
fairly.22
B. The QV Approach
A corporation could implement QV by amending its charter
to provide that all shareholder voting would be conducted
through QV. In particular, the charter would provide that when-
ever a board election, charter amendment, or major transaction
occurs, a QV election would take place. Anyone-including peo-
ple with no relation to the corporation-would have the right to
participate. Note that shareholders would not vote the number
of shares they own; large shareholders and small shareholders
are in the same position as each other, and indeed in the same
position as nonshareholders, who would also have the right to
participate. The funds paid in from QV would be disbursed into
the corporation's treasury and thus would disproportionately
benefit large shareholders and would not benefit nonsharehold-
ers. However, no shareholder would ever be able to receive back
21 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 348-49 (Foundation 2d ed 2009).
22 See Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74
NYU L Rev 161, 230-31 (1999); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore, Improv-
ing Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 Wash U L Q 849, 858 (1994).
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(implicitly or explicitly) more than 1 percent of the funds raised
by the votes she bought herself. If a shareholder has a greater
than 1 percent shareholding, any funds she contributes would be
distributed back directly to shareholders, with 1 percent going to
her and the remaining funds being directly rebated to other
shareholders in proportion to their holdings pro rata, even if
these other shareholders are themselves large. This rule pre-
vents the implicit price of votes from being (more than slightly)
lower for a large voter compared to a small voter.
QV is superior to majority- or supermajority-rule voting be-
cause it ensures ex post efficient outcomes. QV blocks manageri-
al opportunism because managerial opportunism is by definition
inefficient. And QV minimizes the tyranny of majority share-
holders by preventing majorities from using inefficient projects
to transfer value from minorities to themselves.23 When the ma-
jority supports an inefficient merger, the minority will outvote it
by buying a larger number of votes. Because the minority loses
more than the majority gains, and QV guarantees ex post effi-
ciency, QV will block the transaction. When the majority gains
more than the minority loses, the transaction will take place,
but it is ex post efficient, and the minority will be protected in
part by its payoffs under QV.
Of course, ex post efficiency is not the only, or even the pri-
mary, goal in designing a corporate charter. Instead, charter-
writers seek to maximize the amount of capital raised, which
depends on the marginal value of owning additional shares ex
ante, in anticipation of future decisions, rather than total effi-
ciency ex post, as we discuss in Appendix A. While there is no
guarantee QV will maximize this ex ante shareholder value, it
seems unlikely any mechanism could, given that individuals' in-
centives ex post will always be based on how the decision affects
their level of ex post utility rather than their ex ante marginal
willingness to pay for shares. Normal voting, for example, seems
far less likely to maximize ex ante shareholder value, especially
given that the inefficient manipulations by majority sharehold-
ers to expropriate minority shareholders (impossible under QV)
are a sure-fire way to destroy ex ante value of shares. Maximiz-
ing ex post efficiency seems much more likely to align with ex
23 QV fails only when the population of voters is small or there is aggregate uncer-
tainty about the distribution of valuations, and as noted above it outperforms voting typ-
ically in these cases. See Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying at *29-30 (cited in note 6).
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ante shareholder value than do other equally ex post but also
inefficient rules.
The most unusual feature of QV from the standpoint of cor-
porate law is that anyone-including nonshareholders-can
vote. Thus, large shareholders have no greater voting power
than small shareholders, and shareholders have no greater vot-
ing power than creditors, employees, neighbors, or even ordinary
people with no relationship with the corporation. If this feature
of QV seems puzzling, note first of all that most people in the
world will not exercise their right to vote for the simple reason
that they must pay in order to vote, and they are extremely un-
likely to outpay, and hence outvote, shareholders and others
who have a pecuniary stake in the corporation. This is especially
true given the fixed transactions costs of participating in such a
vote. Similarly, large shareholders will normally pay more to
vote than small shareholders will because large shareholders
gain more from the outcome. Moreover, while nonstakeholders
can vote, they do not receive any money from the vote purchases
of others, as that money goes into the corporate treasury. Final-
ly, bear in mind that even under the current system nonstake-
holders can vote merely by taking the (usually) financially trivi-
al step of purchasing a share of stock. The distinction between
corporate stakeholders and outsiders has never been very
clear.24
The main point to keep in mind is that QV guarantees that
the transaction will be ex post efficient, thus maximizing the
value of the corporation. In this way, QV ensures that share-
holder value is maximized. Regular voting rules like majority
and supermajority do not ensure ex post efficient outcomes and
24 When a corporation such as a mutual or investment fund serves as a common
agent for multiple principals, the common agent can buy votes only as one individual.
This means, for example, that if the corporation seeks to cast 10 votes, it must pay $100,
rather than (say) $10 on behalf of 10 principals who each vote once for $1. This is true
even if the funds used to purchase the votes belong to the principals rather than the
agent. If principals delegate this decision to the agent, they would not then be allowed to
vote a second time themselves, but would be able to monitor the behavior of the agent.
This offers a simple means of extending QV to representative and other delegated situa-
tions: each individual can vote only under one identity, even when she represents many
individuals. By monitoring their agent, these individuals forfeit the right to vote them-
selves. This leads to efficiency by precisely the same logic that makes QV efficient more
generally, so long as the agent acts in the collective interests of the principals, as the
votes she will buy on behalf of her principals will be proportional to the sum of their util-
ities.
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so are unlikely to have superior incentives on ex ante behavior.25
Under normal voting, in the absence of legal protections, outsid-
ers with interests contrary to those of the firm may buy up a ma-
jority of shares and inefficiently undermine the firm. Under QV
such behavior could occur only when it is socially efficient, which
would greatly limit the scope for outside manipulation.
As a result of this feature, QV can be used more often than
shareholder voting in the current system. Because QV is more
accurate and robust than the current system, it would be rea-
sonable to use it for transactions whose magnitudes fall below
the size that currently requires a vote. For this reason, advo-
cates of shareholder democracy should endorse QV.
A recurrent criticism of the current system of shareholder
voting is that shareholders have insufficient incentive to inform
themselves because part of the benefit of their voting is exter-
nalized on other shareholders. Because they do not adequately
inform themselves, they either do not vote or vote badly. Be-
cause of the close connection between the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism and QV, the results of Professors Dirk Bergemann
and Juuso Valimaki imply that under QV, unlike under stand-
ard voting, individuals have an incentive to optimally collect in-
formation that is relevant to their preferences and beliefs so long
as these do not have spillovers to what decision is in the interests
of others.26 Obviously in the corporate context, much information
does spill over to others as each small shareholder captures only
a small part of the value of such information. QV will not pro-
vide efficient incentives for information acquisition in this case.
Nonetheless, we conjecture, though we have not tried to prove,
that QV is superior to traditional voting along this dimension.
Intuitively, under voting, one needs only enough information to
decide which side one favors. Under QV, one has an incentive to
achieve a much finer determination of the intensity of one's
preference, which seems likely to increase information acquisi-
tion.
More generally, it is well-known that markets do not gener-
ally provide efficient incentives for information acquisition. As
Professor Jack Hirshleifer argues, information is often under-
provided because of the inability of the informed individual to
appropriate the total social value of the information; it may also
25 We will discuss one possible limitation on this argument in Part II.D below.
26 See Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki, Information Acquisition and Efficient
Mechanism Design, 70 Econometrica 1007, 1026-27 (2002).
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be overprovided when it is used, for example, to beat another in-
dividual to an arbitrage opportunity as is common in high-speed
trading.27 Matters are very similar under QV: information rele-
vant to the overall direction of preferences of many individuals
will be underprovided, while information about how close the
election is (and thus how valuable votes are) will be overprovid-
ed as this information is essentially zero-sum. Thus QV provides
all of the benefits, and costs, of a market economy in its incen-
tives for information acquisition, a set of trade-offs that, at least
since Hayek,28 has been considered overall superior to those aris-
ing from democratic voting.
One might object that under QV people will refrain from
buying large blocks of shares because they do not obtain voting
advantages. People with large blocks of shares will have more
intense preferences regarding mergers and the like, and so they
will anticipate that they will spend more money on voting than
people with small blocks of shares. But in the current system,
the right to vote is close to worthless.29 People typically buy large
blocks of shares not to obtain voting rights but to obtain a larger
portion of the profit of a firm. QV, by guaranteeing that the firm
will enter only ex post efficient transactions, should increase ra-
ther than reduce the value of equity. Furthermore, the funds
raised through the expenditures on votes are added to the value
of the corporation, raising the value of shares. It is plausible
that this additional revenue will more than outweigh any in-
creased value of shares from accompanying voting rights. For
example, in recent experimental work on a voting system closely
related to QV, Professors Jacob Goeree and Jingjing Zhang show
that the revenue raised makes the overwhelming majority of in-
dividuals, even those who end up with much less influence, sup-
port QV over voting in experiments.30 We discuss these results in
greater detail in Appendix A.
Indeed, a major problem with the current system of share-
holder voting is that it compels corporations to inefficiently bundle
27 See Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Re-
ward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am Econ Rev 561, 567-70 (1971).
28 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (1945).
29 See Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decou-
pling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Own-
ership, 13 J Corp Fin 343, 348-53 (2007).
30 See Jacob K. Goeree and Jingjing Zhang, Electoral Engineering: One Man, One
449e Bid *16-18 (Mar 18, 2013), online at http://rangevoting.org/GoereeZhangMar2013.pdf
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
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the right to receive dividends and the right to vote. The two
rights need not go together, as is clear from various preferred
stock arrangements in which voting rights are severed or dilut-
ed. It is not entirely clear why the law prohibits people from sell-
ing their votes independently of their shares. As we discuss in
Part II.C, the best argument for the ban on vote buying is that
the current legal system requires majority or supermajority vot-
ing, and it is easier to circumvent these rules by buying votes
alone (given that shareholders without controlling blocks value
votes very little) than by buying shares.31 A more fundamental
reason is that linear vote buying would, as described in Part I,
lead to the inefficient dictatorship of individuals with intense
preferences. But this is precisely the problem solved by QV.
Another possible objection to QV is that it would allow in-
terest groups or others to shut down a corporation they dislike
on ideological grounds. If they can buy votes without buying
shares, they can destroy a corporation in which they have no
economic interest. The problem with this argument is that these
outsiders would have to spend an enormous amount of money to
buy votes, and this money would go to outvoted shareholders.
The transaction is possible only if the social value of the firm
taking account of outsider interests is less than zero. Given that
it would be in fact cheaper under the current system for outsid-
ers to gain control of and shut down a firm simply by buying a
majority of shares, and we virtually never observe such transac-
tions, we are skeptical of this objection. Furthermore, as we dis-
cuss in our critique of appraisal remedies in the next Section,
unless such a group of outsiders is very large, under QV it is
cheaper for them to pay the value of the firm plus a small sweet-
ener to current shareholders so that shareholders will vote in
favor of the proposal themselves than attempt to outvote the
outsiders directly. Such a prospect can only increase value to
shareholders. Corporate bylaws should ensure they do so by
prohibiting side payments contingent on the vote, forcing out-
siders to pay only shareholders (and not a large group of outsid-
ers) to persuade them to approve their plans. Enforcement of
such rules could fall under antitrust law.
31 For a discussion on voting markets, see Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53
Stan L Rev 111, 123-24 (2000); Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, The New Vote Buy-
ing: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S Cal L Rev 811, 852-54
(2006).
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QV is not a panacea. It is subject to the same arbitrage risks
as majority and supermajority voting. For example, if a board
wants to avoid a vote on a merger, it still retains the option to
undertake the merger through a shell subsidiary.32 However, at
a minimum, these arbitrage risks are no worse under QV. And if
QV is a better system, then shareholders may resist arbitrage
(for example, by barring arbitrage transactions in the charter)
because they care more about making their preferences felt
through voting than they do under the regular system. 33
C. Square-Root Voting
Reforms of all types, and not just reforms to corporate law,
often encounter a hostile reception simply because they are un-
familiar and are at variance with entrenched norms. QV may
face a similar fate because of some of its unusual features. Even
though money plays a significant role in shareholder voting-
rich shareholders who buy more shares vote more-there may be
some uneasiness with explicit vote buying, as one can see from
the literature and cases on that topic. 34 Allowing nonsharehold-
ers to vote also seems unusual. And the redistribution of funds
collected through the QV process would be novel in the corporate
context.
To address these concerns, we propose as a slightly more
modest alternative a variant of QV that we will call Square-Root
Voting (SRV). SRV provides simply that only shareholders vote,
and that shareholders have the right to vote the square root of
the number of shares they own. A shareholder who owns 1 share
gets 1 vote; a shareholder who owns 4 shares gets 2 votes; a
shareholder who owns 10 shares gets 3.2 votes; and so on.
SRV is formally almost identical to QV. To see why, consider
the perspective of an investor who does not yet own any stock in
Corporation X. Corporation X announces its intention to merge
32 We have also not addressed how board voting would work; our focus instead has
been on shareholder approval of transactions. Very roughly, board voting could work like
this: SRV should be used to elect the directors. Shareholders vote in favor or against var-
ious candidates for the board, and those who receive the largest net number of positive
votes are elected to the board. Each director is then given a number of tokens equal to
the number of net positive votes she received. The director then allocates her tokens
across various QV votes over a given period of time. We do not have the space to defend
this proposal here, and save it for future research.
33 On the other hand, managers set on opportunism may work harder to engage in
arbitrage.
34 See Part II.D.
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with Corporation Y. Under current law, the investor can pur-
chase stock in X (or Y) and then exercise the voting rights asso-
ciated with the share (or shares) of stock. Thus, the investor
might buy the stock both because she believes that the merger
will take place and that it will increase the value of the stock,
and because she hopes to use the voting power to increase the
probability that the merger will take place.
Under QV, the investor chooses the number of shares that
she buys solely for the purpose of optimizing payment streams.
She separately buys as many votes as is optimal for her to influ-
ence the outcome. Under SRV, the investor effectively buys
stocks for their voting power. Because she can expect to resell
them for the same price that she buys them for, she incurs only
the opportunity cost of buying them. SRV ensures that this op-
portunity cost increases at a quadratic rate, and in this way re-
sembles QV. If the ban on "empty voting" (trading votes and
shares separately, as discussed in the next Section) were
dropped, SRV would be even closer to QV, differing only in the
fixed number of potential votes. 35
Yet SRV differs from QV in several ways that may be im-
portant as a matter of symbolic political rhetoric but are of little
importance substantively. Most important, under SRV share-
holders vote as they normally do; the only difference is that their
voting power increases at a decreasing rate as the number of
votes they cast increases. This approach differs in degree but not
in kind from voting rules established in the charters of many
corporations, for example, through the creation of classes with
different voting rights, as are used for poison pills. SRV also
does not permit nonshareholders to vote and does not require
the collection and the redistribution of funds. These similarities
to existing practices may make SRV more palatable to judges
and corporate boards than is QV, at least in the short term, and
may smooth the way for the adoption of more explicit QV in the
long term.
D. Legal Issues
As noted earlier, corporate law gives corporations a great deal
of freedom to fashion voting systems. Although most corporations
35 This fixed supply is irrelevant as it determines, by the laws of supply and de-
mand, endogenously only the multiplier in front of the quadratic term in the price of
votes. Because this multiplier is irrelevant to all of the properties of QV, it makes no dif-
ference.
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use regular majority or supermajority rule for major transac-
tions like mergers, charter amendments, and board elections,
there is a great deal of variation. For example, through a series
of agreements with shareholders of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg
has 57.1 percent of voting control even though his economic
stake in Facebook is only 28.4 percent.36
A corporation could provide in its charter that shareholders
would have the conventional right to a share of the firm's prof-
its, but that there would be no right to vote attached to each
share. Instead, whenever the firm holds a vote, anyone regis-
tered as a shareholder at the time of the vote would have the
right to participate. 37 Each shareholder, regardless of how many
shares he owns, would have the same voting power: the right to
cast one vote for $1, two votes for $4, and so on. The payments
would be made to the corporation, which would either deposit
them in its treasury or put them in a fund, which would then be
distributed pro rata to the shareholders at the conclusion of vot-
ing.
The major legal obstacle to QV is the somewhat qualified
ban on vote buying, but the law on vote buying does not directly
apply to QV despite its name. Indeed, existing law is better in-
terpreted as directed at vote selling-by shareholders-not vote
buying in the QV system, in which the corporation, not a third
party, sells the vote and the consideration is deposited in the
corporate treasury. Thus, the traditional per se rule against vote
selling does not apply to QV on its terms.
Moreover, the rationale for that per se rule was that
each stockholder should be entitled to rely upon the inde-
pendent judgment of his fellow stockholders .... The appar-
ent rationale is that by requiring each stockholder to exer-
cise his individual judgment as to all matters presented,
"[t]he security of the small stockholders is found in the nat-
ural disposition of each stockholder to promote the best in-
terests of all, in order to promote his individual interests."38
36 Evelyn M. Rush, Zuckerberg Takes Control, You Get $100, NY Times DealBook
Blog (NY Times Feb 8, 2012), online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/08
/zuckerberg-takes-control-you-get- 100 (visited Mar 2, 2014).
37 As we noted earlier, voting rights need not be limited to shareholders; but we
suspect that in the early stages of its adoption, corporations are likely to confine voting
rights to shareholders.
38 Schreiber v Carney, 447 A2d 17, 24 (Del Chanc 1982), quoting Cone v Russell, 21
A 847, 849 (NJ Eq 1891).
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Even if this rationale were accepted, it would not provide an ob-
jection to QV, because QV in fact advances the interest of small
shareholders much more effectively than ordinary voting (with
or without vote buying) does.
Delaware courts now reject any per se rule against vote buy-
ing and instead ban vote buying when it is fraudulent or violates
a test of "intrinsic fairness."39 Clearly, there is nothing fraudu-
lent about QV. The intrinsic fairness test is rather obscure, but
we also see nothing unfair about QV since it ensures ex post effi-
ciency and, as we discuss below, will usually ensure compensa-
tion for outvoted minorities.
A number of academics have launched a separate line of at-
tack on vote buying. A controversy erupted a few years ago over
"empty voting," in which parties engage in financial engineering
in order to separate the vote and the economic value of the share
it is attached to.40 For example, the owner of a share lends the
share to an investor for a very brief period of time during which
a corporate vote is held. The investor exercises the vote during
this period but does not bear any economic consequences of the
vote since the impact of the vote on the value of the firm takes
place after the share is returned to the owner. An investor can
also buy a share in order to obtain the voting right while fully
hedging against any change in the value of the share.
Traditional, linear vote buying, whether in this form or an-
other form, usually leads to inefficient outcomes.41 But these
outcomes result only when vote buying takes place in a regular
voting system and thus, crucially, is linear. In fact, precisely the
same analysis that Weyl uses to show the efficiency of QV im-
plies that linear vote buying is inefficient.42 A broad class of
vote-buying rules nests democracy, dictatorship, and QV all as
special cases. Thus vote buying in general, and QV in particular,
should not be tarnished with the same brush as is linear vote
buying and its dictatorial results. As discussed in the previous
39 Schreiber, 447 A2d at 25-26; Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v Kurz, 992 A2d 377,
388 (Del 2010).
40 See Hu and Black, 79 S Cal L Rev at 828-32 (cited in note 31).
41 For an informal account, see Levmore, 53 Stan L Rev at 124 n 25 (cited in note
31); Hu and Black, 79 S Cal L Rev at 850-51 (cited in note 31). For a formal account, see
Holger Spamann, Derivatives Trading and Negative Voting *7-17 (Harvard Olin Faculty
Discussion Paper No 730, Sept 2012), online at http://www.law.harvard.edu
/programs/olincenter/papers/pdf/Spamann_730.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014). See also Rob-
ert B. Thompson and Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 Vand L Rev 127, 162-66
(2009).
42 See Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying at *40 (cited in note 6).
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Section, "empty voting" and vote buying combined with appro-
priate rules (square-root voting) leads to a fair and efficient out-
come.
Indeed, even if QV were deemed illegal, SRV would almost
certainly survive a legal attack. Under SRV, the shareholder
does not explicitly buy votes; she merely exercises the right to
vote that accompanies her share. The fact that she can possess
votes only equal to the square root of the number of shares does
not, even indirectly, implicate vote buying.
QV (or SRV) is not only lawful; it also reduces the need for
corporate law that protects shareholders from managerial op-
portunism and minority shareholders from large-shareholder
opportunism. Because QV blocks such opportunism, the protec-
tions are not necessary.
The most important such protection is the appraisal reme-
dy. If majority shareholders engineer a merger that appears to
offer unfair payoffs to the minority, the minority can seek pro-
tection in court by demanding an appraisal remedy.43 If it is suc-
cessful, the corporation must pay minority shareholders the ac-
tual value of the shares, as determined by a court after a
lengthy and complex valuation proceeding.
In a QV system, the ability to freeze out minority share-
holders would be greatly diminished or even eliminated. There
are two reasons for this. First, because QV blocks inefficient
mergers, the majority would be unable to effect inefficient mer-
gers in order to transfer value to itself. The majority would be
able to engage in such opportunistic behavior only when the
merger is efficient. Second and more important, QV is particu-
larly unfavorable when a single shareholder or small group of
shareholders attempt to impose their will on a majority. In Ap-
pendix B we show that, because of the small numbers, QV is not
efficient in this case: it is biased against the small manipulative
group! In particular, no individual or small group of sharehold-
ers can ever profitably succeed in outvoting other shareholders
with any significant probability when the number of other
shareholder-voters is large. Even when they do (with very small
probability) win such a vote, the payments they make will typi-
cally fully compensate other shareholders for their loss. Thus, a
shareholder or small group of shareholders seeking to execute
such a plan would find it cheaper and more reliable to pay the
43 See Kaye v Pantone, Inc, 395 A2d 369, 375 (Del Chanc 1978).
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shareholders enough of the surplus of such a transaction to
make them want to vote for the transaction themselves. Intui-
tively, because the costs of voting are quadratic, and so the cost
of casting the marginal vote increases at a greater-than-linear
rate, it is cheaper as a small group to incentivize others to vote
in your favor than it is to attempt to outvote them yourself. This
self-interest provides a far more effective check on opportunism
than does the bureaucratic and inaccurate appraisal process.
The only case when appraisal could do better is when infor-
mation is hidden from shareholders and is revealed through the
appraisal.
A related and promising application of QV is in the area of
poison pills. In response to a wave of hostile takeovers in the
1980s, many corporations amended their bylaws so as to make it
more difficult for outside investors to succeed in their takeover
efforts. A typical poison pill provides that when an outside in-
vestor obtains shares above a threshold (typically, a significant
minority), then insiders may purchase additional shares at a
discount (for example, 50 percent).44 Thus, insiders can buy up
shares in order to obtain votes to oppose the takeover. Managers
defend poison pills, claiming that takeovers frequently destroy
jobs and disrupt operations. Shareholder activists argue that
poison pills entrench management so that it does not pay for its
mistakes by losing control of the corporation.
Poison pills are controversial but generally lawful in the
United States, although not in all countries, and even in the
United States, they can be challenged under general principles
of corporate law. Now consider a poison pill that incorporates
QV or SRV. A corporation could amend its bylaws to provide
that any hostile takeover be subject to a vote under SRV. SRV
does away with the threshold requirement (which is arbitrary)
and replaces the simple discount rule with the more fine-grained
quadratic function, which effectively makes it cheap for dis-
persed shareholders to vote for or against the merger but costly
for large shareholders including management to oppose it. Since
SRV guarantees ex post efficient results, it should ensure that
takeovers are approved only when they are efficient. Poison pills
44 See, for example, Richard Siklos, News Corp. Sued over Poison Pill Move, NY
Times C3 (Oct 8, 2005).
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should be lawful and immune to challenge as long as they com-
ply with these principles. 45
CONCLUSION
QV holds great promise as a mechanism for eliciting peo-
ple's private valuations. It is well suited to the corporate con-
text, which lacks the norm of one-person-one-vote and in which
law and tradition permit people to use money to signal the in-
tensity of their interests in managerial decisions. As with any
innovation, QV merits experimentation prior to widespread
adoption to help reveal potential weaknesses that eluded our
analysis given the novelty of QV compared to the many centu-
ries of experience with voting. The flexibility of corporate char-
ter law allows for such small-scale experimentation by innova-
tive, early-adopting firms that could then be studied by others
and, if successful, spread. In the longer term, if such experimen-
tation is successful we believe that QV could be useful in other
settings. Professors Scott Duke Kominers and Weyl advocate its
use as an alternative to eminent domain in land assembly;46
Posner and Weyl incorporate it into a proposal for reforming
Chapter 11; 47 and Weyl suggests variants that might be plausi-
ble for committee or broader public decision making even if an
aversion to "money in politics" persists.48
45 For a brief argument along these lines, see Eric Posner and Glen Weyl, How to
Make Poison Pills Palatable, NY Times DealBook Blog (NY Times July 17, 2013), online
at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/how-to-make-poison.pills-palatable (visited
Mar 2, 2014).
46 Scott Duke Kominers and E. Glen Weyl, Concordance among Holdouts *24-25
(Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper, Sept 2012), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1591466 (visited Mar 2, 2014).
47 Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Voting Rules in Chapter 11: A Proposal for Re-
form (unpublished manuscript 2013) (on file with authors).
48 Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying at *38-41 (cited in note 6).
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